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I. INTRODUCTION: FORCE DIRECTED AGAINST POLICE OFFICERS IN
STATE V. CLISHIAf 1
On June 25, 1992, the Hampden Police received a phone call from
a woman who claimed that Andrew Clisham had told her that he
had killed his wife, Ida Clisham. Two Hampden police officers went
1. 614 A.2d 1297 (Me. 1992).
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to Clisham's residence to investigate. Upon arriving, the police
knocked at the door and asked permission to search the residence
for Ida Clisham. The officers did not have a warrant to enter the
premises. When Mr. Clisham denied them entry, they retreated and
waited for more officers to arrive.2
With additional officers on the scene, the police were able to cover
the front door and all of the other exits. The chief of police knocked
on the front door and threatened to break it down if Clisham would
not let them enter to determine whether Ida had been harmed. In-
side, Andrew Clisham armed himself with two knives and opened
the door. He told the police that he would not allow them to search
for his wife and that he would use the knives to prevent them from
entering his home. The police drew their weapons and aimed them
at Clisham. Over the course of the next hour, the officers attempted
to persuade Clisham to allow them to enter. Clisham alternately
picked up the knives and put them down, threatening at times that
he had used them against others and that he was proficient in
throwing them accurately.- Finally, Clisham surrendered his knives
and allowed the police to enter the house. Mrs. Clisham was not on
the premises. 4 The police arrested Clisham and charged him with
criminal threatening. 5
At trial in district court and on appeal before the superior court,
Clisham based his defense on section 104(3)(B) of the Maine Crimi-
nal Code, justifying the use of deadly force.6 However, on appeal
before the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court,
the relevant provision was determined by the court to be section
104(1), which provides, in pertinent part:
[a] person in possession or control of premises or a person who is
licensed or privileged to be thereon is justified in using nondeadly
force upon another when and to the extent that he reasonably be-
lieves it necessary to prevent or terminate the commission of a
criminal trespass by such other in or upon such premises.'
Prior to Clisham, the issue of the applicability of section 104 in
connection with a police entry onto a private dwelling had not been
2. Id.
3. State's Brief at 4, State of Maine v. Clisham (No. PEN-92-129).
4. Although the opinion in Clisham does not indicate where, or if, Mrs. Clisham
was found, she was unharmed. Telephone Interview with Jeffrey M. Silverstein, As-
sistant District Attorney, Penobscot County (Apr. 13, 1993).
5. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 209 (West 1983) provides:
1. A person is guilty of criminal threatening if he intentionally or know-
ingly places another person in fear of imminent bodily injury.
2. Criminal threatening is a Class D crime.
6. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 104 (West 1983). See infra note 97 for the
relevant language of § 104.




squarely presented to the Law Court for decision. The potential con-
sequences of such an application raise a host of concerns. While the
procedure followed in Clisham's case in investigating the complaint
was flawed in some respects,8 allowing section 104 to operate in this
context to justify Cisham's forceful response is problematic.
Clisham had clearly violated the criminal threatening statute and
had done so in disregard of the authority of police officers in the
performance of their duties. This would seem to have been a strong
case for prosecution.
On a purely practical level, it is important to consider what effect
a successful assertion of a section 104 justification defense would
have in this situation. As far as Clisham knew, it was entirely possi-
ble that the officers were acting pursuant to a valid warrant. Neces-
sarily, there is a concern that if section 104 is found to apply to such
a situation, citizens-who have no accurate way of gauging the law-
fulness of a search-will determine for themselves whether or not a
police action is lawful. In other words, if citizens are made aware
that the "right guess" may excuse an otherwise criminal act, or even
that guessing is an option, that awareness may serve to encourage
them to respond violently to assertions of police authority.0
Moreover, law enforcement officers will undoubtedly question the
wisdom of a policy that sanctions a violent response to what they
believe is the legitimate performance of their duty. If officers must
face the prospect of an after-the-fact determination of the legality of
their actions in order to know whether the violence they encounter
is justified, they may hesitate to investigate complaints. And while it
may be argued that the sanctity of the home warrants such caution,
violence on the part of the homeowner or dweller only escalates the
confrontation.
Such an escalation may also yield the anomalous result that the
force sanctioned by section 104 could lead to the justifiable use of
force by a police officer under section 107. Section 107 provides in
part:
2. A law enforcement officer is justified in using deadly force only
when he reasonably believes such force is necessary:
A. To defend himself or a 3rd person from what he reasonably
believes is the imminent use of deadly force.' 0
8. See State v. Clisham, 614 A.2d at 1298-99. The police were without a warrant,
and probable cause was never established.
9. See Court Rules Threat Was Justified, PORTLAND PaRss HERALD, Oct. 8, 1992,
at 4B. If the headline were not enough, the teaser was more explicitly provocative:
"The Supreme Court says a man was justified in threatening police with knives when
they attempted an illegal search." Id. The article displayed prominently the language
of the Clisham opinion: "The fact that police may have been acting in good faith doe3
not justify an officer's forceful entry into a private home, the court said." Id.
10. ME. Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 107 (West 1983 & Supp. 1992-1993). The pro-
visions of § 107, excepting paragraph A of subsection 2, all refer to the use of force in
1993]
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The situation in which Clisham and the investigating officers found
themselves could easily have turned into one in which the officers
deemed it necessary to use force for self-protection. In such a case,
the legality of the officers' use of force would turn on an application
of section 107. In a case where the search by police officers would
have been unlawful, either section 104 or section 107 would have to
govern.
In State v. Clisham," the Law Court unanimously found that sec-
tion 104(1) of the Maine Criminal Code operated to justify the use
of non-deadly force by a private citizen seeking to prevent an illegal
search of his house by police officers. This Comment will focus on
the justification provisions of the Maine Criminal Code a§ they re-
late to law'enforcement practices and will examine how the Law
Court's most recent decision 12 interpreting one of the provisions af-
fects that relationship. This Comment will argue that the policy un-
derlying the justification provisions mandates that the justification
defense be denied to persons responding violently to an assertion of
police authority, and that the Law Court's interpretation of section
104 in Clisham represents a departure from this policy.
This Comment first presents the Law Court's reasoning in State
v. Clisham (Part II). It then explores the theory of justification gen-
erally (Part III), focusing on the existing body of Maine law with
regard to the relationship between the justification provisions and
arrest (Part IV). Concluding that Clisham is inconsistent with ex-
isting Maine case law and the justification provisions of the Maine
Criminal Code, the Comment recommends that the Clisham result
be reconciled with both (Part V). The Comment then proposes a
legislative response designed to reconcile this conflict (Part VI). Fi-
nally, it provides, as alternatives to the recognition of a right to re-
spond violently to police authority, suggestions for controlling police
conduct (Part VII).
the context of an arrest. Although there is no case law on this point, it would appear
that the statutory justification for the use of force by police officers granted by para-
graph 2 extends beyond attempts to effect arrests to any situation in which an officer
is engaged in the performance of his or her official duties. As paragraph 2, subsection
A, does not contain the restrictive "arrest" language of the other sections of the pro-
vision, this would seem to be a reasonable interpretation. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
17-A, § 107(2)(A) (West 1983). Without such an interpretation, a police officer would
not be justified in the use of force outside the arrest context, except as a citizen under
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 108 (West 1983 & Supp. 1992-1993). Note also that
§ 107 allows for the use of non-deadly force by police officers to defend themselves.
See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 107(1)(B) (West 1983).




IL THE CLIsHAm COURT AUTHORIZES RESISTING FORCE BY A
PERSON WHO BELIEVES THAT THE POLICE SEARCH IS UNLAWFUL
On July 25, 1991, Andrew Clisham was tried in district court on a
criminal threatening charge. He asserted as a defense that under
section 104(3)(B)(2)23 of the Maine Criminal Code he was entitled to
use deadly force in the defense of his home because he reasonably
believed that the officers, once in his home, would commit the
crimes of invasion of privacy14 and criminal restraint.'0 The district
court found Clisham guilty of criminal threatening after concluding
that he could not have reasonably believed that the police were
likely to commit a crime after entering his dwelling. Clisham unsuc-
cessfully appealed to the superior court and subsequently appealed
to the Law Court. 6
Only four weeks after the submission of briefs, and without oral
argument, the Law Court found that it was error for the district
court to have applied section 104(3)(B)(2), the "deadly force" provi-
sion of section 104, and that the applicable statute was section
104(1), the non-deadly force provision. " The district court had pre-
mised its decision on a finding that Clisham did not reasonably be-
lieve the police would commit further crimes once they entered his
home. "" While this would have been the relevant inquiry under sec-
tion 104(3)(B)(2), justifying the use of deadly force, the Law Court
reasoned that such an inquiry was unnecessary here because
Clisham had only threatened the use of deadly force."' Citing State
v. Williams,20 the Law Court asserted that the mere threatened use
of deadly force is tantamount to the actual use of non-deadly
force.21 Since deadly force had only been threatened and not used, it
was error for the district court to apply the deadly force provision.
Rather, section 104(1), governing the use of non-deadly force, should
13. ME REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 104(3)(B)(2) (West 1983).
14. Mip REV. STAT. ANN. tit 17-A, § 511 (West 1983).
15. Ma. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 302 (West 1983).
16. State v. Clisham, 614 A.2d at 1297.
17. Id. at 1298.
18. Id.
19. Id.; Ma REV. STAT. ANN. tit 17-A, § 2 (West 1983 & Supp. 1992-1993) pro-
vides definitions for "deadly force" and "nondeadly force":
8. "Deadly force" means physical force which a person uses with the intent
of causing, or which he knows to create a substantial risk of causing, death
or serious bodily injury. Intentionally or recklessly discharging a firearm in
the direction of another person or a moving vehicle constitutes deadly
force...
18. "Nondeadly force" means any physical force which is not deadly force.
20. 433 A.2d 765 (Me. 1981).
21. State v. Clisham, 614 A.2d at 1298. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.11 (1962)
("A threat to cause death or serious bodily injury, by the production of a weapon or
otherwise, so long as the actor's purpose is limited to creating an apprehension that
he will use deadly force if necessary, does not constitute deadly force").
1993]
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have been applied.22
The Law Court noted that under section 104(1) there is no re-
quiremejit that the person in possession of the premises reasonably
believe that some other crime will be committed within the dwelling
place.23 Finding that Clisham was indeed in possession of the prem-
ises, the court concluded that he would have been justified under
section 104(1) in using non-deadly force if he reasonably believed
that such force was necessary to prevent the commission of a crimi-
nal trespass by the police officers.2 4
The court went on to note that the police officers were without a
warrant and had failed to establish probable cause. s Since Clisham
had not iven his consent to the police entry, the court concluded
that absent exigent circumstances 2 the warrantless search would
have been unconstitutional.27 Therefore, although the officers may
have been acting in good faith, their forced entry would have consti-
tuted a criminal trespass. 28 In support of this conclusion the court
quoted State v. Boilard:29 "Warrantless official intrusions, without
22. State v. Clisham, 614 A.2d at 1298.
23. Id. See M. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 104(1) (West 1983).
24. State v. Clisham, 614 A.2d at 1299.
25. Id.
26. The Clisham court passed over the question of whether there were exigent
circumstances allowing the officers to search without a warrant. It is at least arguable
that such exigent circumstances did exist. The officers had reason to believe that Ida
Clisham had been harmed, and they did not know whether she was still in the house.
Further, they could have reasonably believed that Andrew Clisham, armed with
knives, presented a danger to Ida Clisham or to others who might have been in the
house. Under these facts, it is not clear that the exigent circumstances exception to
the warrant requirement would not apply. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509
(1978) ("a warrantless entry by criminal law enforcement officials may be legal when
there is compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant"); United
States v. Guarente, 810 F. Supp. 350 (D. Me. 1993) (warrantless entry justified by
exigent circumstances where police officers were responding to a reported domestic
dispute involving a weapon). See also William C. Donnino & Anthony J. Girese, Exi-
gent Circumstances for a Warrantless Home Arrest, 45 ALB. L. REv. 90 (1980).
27. State v. Clisham, 614 A.2d at 1299. The Law Court cited Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573, 585-86 (1980) (absent exigent circumstances or consent, a law enforce-
ment officer may -not make a warrantless entry into a suspect's home to make a rou-
tine felony arrest); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1984).
28. State v. Cisham, 614 A.2d at 1299.
29. 488 A.2d 1380 (Me. 1985). The facts of Boilard are as follows: On August 20,
1983, the South Berwick police department received a telephone call reporting shout-
ing between Donald Boilard and one of his children coming from the Boilard home. A
police officer was dispatched to the scene of the dispute. The officer was told by the
dispatcher that it sounded as if Bolard were beating his children. When the officer
arrived, Boilard threw open the front door of the residence and told the officer "to get
- off his property." Id. at 1382.
In response to the officer's request to see the children, Boilard informed the officer
that it was his house and he did not have to show the officer the children. Before
Boilard could close the door, however, the police officer managed to force his way into
the Boilard home. Once inside the home, the officer attempted to make his way into
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consent, upon the citizen's private property. in the absence of
probable cause and exigent circumstances, are unconstitutionally
[sic] unauthorized and unjustified and constitute a trespass."30
the living room where Boilard's two sons were sitting. Boilard made an unsuccessful
attempt to halt the officer's progress by pushing the officer outside the house. A scuf-
fle between Boilard and the officer followed, and Boilard was placed under arrest for
assault and obstruction of government administration, and later charged with those
crimes. Following a trial, he was convicted on both counts. Id. at 1382-83.
On appeal, Boilard challenged the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss
the charges against him or to suppress evidence of the crimes of assault and obstruc-
tion of government administration. Boilard presented, on appeal before the Law
Court, the same argument that he had made to the district court in support of his
motion, contending that it should have been granted because of the allegedly illegal
police entry into his home which resulted in the confrontation with the officer and led
to his arrest. Id. at 1382.
The Law Court reversed the finding of the motions judge that the police officer had
lawfully entered Boilard's home, deciding instead that the officer's forceful entry into
the home constituted a trespass. The court did not, however, reverse the lower court's
denial of Boilard's motion to suppress evidence constituting the basis of the charges,
or to have the charges dismissed.
30. State v. Clisham, 614 A.2d at 1299 (quoting State v. Boilard, 488 A.2d at 1385
(Me. 1985)). Implicit in the Clisham court's use of this quotation is that which is
made express in Boilard, that is, that "the [Maine Criminal] Code spells out the right
of a person to use force against unwanted intrusions upon one's property, without
differentiating between warrantless police personnel and other ordinary citizens."
State v. Boilard, 488 A.2d at 1385. While Code § 104 requires that the intrusion be
"criminal" and not simply "unwanted," it does not by terms differentiate between
police personnel and other citizens. See ME. Ray. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 104 (West
1983); M. Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 2(20) (West 1983) ("person" defined).
It is instructive to note that the justification provisions of the Maine Criminal
Code, including § 104, were taken from the New Hampshire Criminal Code. See
Comment to MF. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 104 (West 1983). Many of the sections
of the New Hampshire Criminal Code and their Maine Criminal Code counterparts
do not explicitly differentiate between police officers and private citizens. One such
section in the Maine Code is § 105, entitled "Use of force in property offenses." The
New Hampshire counterpart to this section is § 627 of the New Hampshire Criminal
Code. See N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 627:8 (1986).
A recent decision of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, State v. Haas, 596 A.2d
127 (N.H. 1991), is useful for its discussion of § 627:8, and its approach to the justifi-
cation provisions vis-&-vis law enforcement personnel In Haas, the defendant was
found guilty of the offenses of simple assault, N.H. REy. STAT. ANN. § 631:2-a (1986),
and resisting arrest, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 642.2 (1986 & Supp. 1992). These crimi-
nal charges arose from an altercation between the defendant and a police officer,
when the officer was supervising the removal of the defendant's automobile from a
private parking lot. State v. Haas, 596 A.2d at 128.
The chief of police had told the officer that a court order had been issued the previ-
ous day which prevented the defendant from parking in the lot. In reality, the order
forbade the defendant from having any contact with the owner of the lot but did not
specifically mention the parking area. Id. at 129. On appeal, the defendant claimed it
was error on the part of the trial court to decline to instruct the jury on his theory of
the defense, which entitled him to use force to the extent he believed necessary to
prevent a reasonably apparent unlawful taking of personal property. Id. at 130.
After noting the relevant New Hampshire statutory provision relating to use of
force in property offenses (the equivalent of § 752-A of the Maine Criminal Code,
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Having determined that the officers' entry would have been a
criminal trespass, the Clisham court turned to the question of
whether Clisham reasonably believed that the force he used was nec-
essary to prevent or terminate the trespass. While the record did not
include a specific finding on this issue, the Law Court found that
Clisham's threatened use of knives to prevent armed police officers,
who were threatening to kick down his door, from entering his home
was reasonably necessary to prevent a trespass. The court concluded
that under section 104(1) Clisham's actions were justified as a
proper exercise of non-deadly force.3 1
III. THE THEORY OF THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE
To understand the operation of the justification defense, it is im-
portant first to understand the role of justification provisions within
the context of a criminal code as a whole. Embodied in any criminal
code is the doctrine of criminalization; that is, legislative enactments
of proscribed forms of conduct. Such a statement of societal prohibi-
tions, however, will suffer from being either overinclusive or under-
inclusive. A criminal code cannot with specificity set forth society's
determination as to what is and what is not lawful conduct in every
situation.32 In the interest of fairness, the criminal code is fashioned
in general terms and permits those accused of committing crimes to
defend themselves with claims of justification.3 3 Justification doc-
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 752-A (West 1983 & Supp. 1992-1993)), the court
turned to defendant's argument that § 627:8 of the New Hampshire Criminal Code
justified his conduct in resisting the officer's attempt to remove his vehicle. The court
wrote:
To say that a statute designed to permit and condone self-help as a way of
protecting oneself from the actions of tort-feasors, wrongdoers, and run-of-
the-mill miscreants authorizes the use of force against a police officer dis-
charging his duties ... is to stretch the statute past the breaking
point .... There is ample protection to the public from unlawful seizure of
property by law enforcement agents, either by way of civil claims for dam-
ages or by way of the appropriate application of the exclusionary rule.
State v. Haas, 596 A.2d at 130-31.
Thus, while the New Hampshire statute does not on its face differentiate between
police officers and private citizens, the court found such a distinction necessary to
effectuate the legislative intent behind the provision.
31. For further analysis of Clisham and § 104, see infra part V.
32. One commentator has attributed this inherent limitation of a criminal code to
the impossibility of providing for the infinite variety of factual situations and, more
important, to the fact that human moral judgments are too complex to be repre-
sented by a set of rules. A criminal code is thus only an approximation of a society's
intuitive judgments. See Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm
as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability, 23 U.C.L. L. REv. 266, 271-72 (1975).
33. In Maine, this result is accomplished by means of § 101 of the Maine Crimi-
nal Code. That section provides in pertinent part:
1. The State is not required to negate any facts expressly designated as a
"defense," or any exception, exclusion or authorization which is set out in
[Vol. 45:385
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trines provide exculpatory exceptions3 ' for certain actions that,
while statutorily wrong, are considered permissible or not harmful to
society.35
Paul Robinson, a leading commentator on criminal law defenses,
has identified three categories of justification:30 (1) the lesser evils or
choice of evils justification; 37 (2) the defensive force justification;"
and (3) the public authority or aggressive force justification.39 Ac-
cording to Robinson, the first category most clearly reflects the gen-
the statute defining the crime by proof at trial, unless the existence of the
defense, exception, exclusion or authorization is in issue as a result of evi-
dence admitted at the trial which is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt on
the issue, in which case the State must disprove its existence beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.
3. Conduct which is justifiable under this chapter constitutes a defense to
any crime; provided that, if a person is justified in using force against an-
other, but he recklessly injures or creates a risk of injury to 3rd persons, the
justification afforded by this chapter is unavailable in the prosecution for
such recklessness. If a defense provided under this chapter is precluded
solely because the requirement that the actor's belief be reasonable has not
been met, he may be convicted only of a crime for which recklessness or
criminal negligence suffices, depending on whether his holding the belief
was reckless or criminally negligent.
ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 101(1), (3) (West 1983).
34. Robinson conceives of the doctrines of justification not as doctrines of "excul-
pation," but rather as part of a system of adjudicatory principles that may, in some
cases, prevent the attachment of blame. In other words, a violation of a criminal stat-
ute does not create a presumption of fault or guilt until the adjudicatory principles of
blame-which include the justification provisions of a code-have been applied.
Thus, a doctrine of justification does not "exculpate" because no fault or guilt has yet
been established. See Paul H. Robinson, Rules of Conduct and Principles of Adjudi-
cation, 57 U. CHL L Rxv. 729, 741-42 (1990).
35. See George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARv. L Rav. 949,
954 (1985) ("Claims of justification concern the rightness, or at least the legal permis-
sibility, of an act that normally violates the law."); Robinson, supra note 32, at 272-73
(arguing that an act which would otherwise be considered criminal is justified if such
act does not effect social harm).
36. See Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82
COLmu L. Rav. 199, 213-16 (1982).
37. This justification is termed "competing harms" under Maine law. See Ma.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 103 (West 1983).
38. For the Maine law counterpart, see M&. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 104, 105,
108 (West 1983 & Supp. 1992-1993) (including defenses categorized as self-defense,
defense of others, and defense of property).
39. The comparable Maine provision is found in M. Rav. STAT. ANK tit. 17-A,
§§ 102, 102-A, 106, 107 (West 1983 & Supp. 1992-1993). Robinson notes that the use
of public authority justifications differs from other justifications generally in that the
former are often limited to certain persons whose position or training warrants their
position as protector of the interests at stake. Robinson, supra note 36, at 216. Such
interests include, inter alia, law enforcement, judicial authority, parental authority,
and military authority. Id.
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eral principle behind the justification defenses. 0 The lesser evils or
competing harms justification is by definition the embodiment of
the balancing notion underlying all of the defenses. Robinson con-
tends that the justification defenses generally are an expression of a
society's need to balance competing harms, and it is this process of
weighing that serves to define- the limitations of a justification
defense."1
While identifying differences among the three general types of de-
fenses, Robinson points to a uniform internal structure that they
share. This structure allows for a necessary and proportionate re-
sponse when certain triggering conditions exist.2 The necessity por-
tion of the structure that Robinson identifies has two elements:43 (1)
a temporal requirement of immediacy of the triggering conditions,
and (2) a limitation on the defendant's use of force to what is neces-
sary to protect or further the interest at stake. If a defendant uses
force that causes more harm than is necessary, he has violated the
necessity requirement and may be denied the justification. In other
words, if non-criminal or less harmful alternatives for avoiding the
threatened harm are available, the infliction of criminal harm is not
justified.4 4
The proportionality requirement is similar to the second prong of
the necessity test in that it places a limit on the harm that may be
used in protection or furtherance of an interest.45 Even when the
triggering conditions are met and less harmful alternatives are un-
available, if the harm caused by the actor is too severe in relation to
the value of the interest sought to be protected, the actor will be
40. See Robinson, supra note 36, at 214. Robinson's illustration of this justifica-
tion involves a forest fire raging towards a town of 10,000 citizens. The actor burns a
field of corn which lies between the fire and the town. The burned field serves as a
firebreak, and the town and its inhabitants are saved. The actor has satisfied all of
the elements of arson by setting fire to the field to destroy it and the immediate harm
he has caused (the destruction of the field) is the harm that the criminal statute
serves to prevent and punish. However, the actor is likely to have a complete defense,
asserts Robinson, because his conduct and its harmful consequences were justified.
Id. at 213-14.
41. Id. at 214.
42. Id. at 216. Robinson provides a general idea of the triggering conditions under
each defense:
In defensive force justifications an aggressor must present a threat of unjus-
tified harm to the protected interest .... Public authority justifications are
triggered when the circumstances arise which evoke the use of authority
given to the actor .... In its purest form, the [lesser evils] defense is avail-
able whenever any legally protected interest is threatened or may be
furthered.
Id.
43. Id. at 217-18.
44. See Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a Historical
Accident on Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 Abi. U1. REv. 11, 20-21 (1986).
45. See Robinson, supra note 36, at 218.
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denied the justification." For example, deadly force cannot be used
to protect against non-deadly force.'"
In general, the criminal law seeks to narrow the range of activity
to which the justification provisions will apply." As noted above,
justification defenses are an exercise in weighing competing values.
The necessity and proportionality requirements are an attempt to
establish guidelines and limitations on the balancing exercise.' 0 A
judicial decision that gives wide interpretation to these limiting con-
cepts runs the risk of encouraging conduct that is harmful to
broader societal interests.50 The relevant question when considering
a justification defense in a particular case should be whether the re-
sult achieved by means of its application is beneficial to society.51
IV. COMPARISON OF THE CLIsAmw RESULT TO THE LAW COURT'S
TREATMENT OF RESISTING FORCE BY A PERSON WHO BELIEVES THAT
AN ARREST IS UNLAWFUL
A. Section 108: Physical Force in Resisting an Arrest and
State v. Austin
5 2
The first decision to interpret the relationship of the justification
provisions of the newly enacted Maine Criminal Code 3 to law en-
46. Id.
47. See Rosen, supra note 44, at 21.
48. See Peter D.W. Heberling, Note, Justification: The Impact of the Model Pe-
nal Code on Statutory Reform, 75 COLUM L Rav. 914, 960-61 (1975).
49. The legislative history of the Maine Criminal Code on the justification provi-
sions demonstrates a sensitivity to these concerns. The legislative record quotes one
member of the Senate Judiciary Committee as stating, with regard to §§ 104 and 108:
Both sections 104 and 108 contain a number of prerequisites which must
be met before the defense of justification is available. I am only going to
dwell on them because I think that they ought to be the determinative pre-
requisites ....
The first limitation is that there must be reasonable belief. This means
that the jury must find that the defendant honestly believed that the cir-
cumstances which gave rise to the right to use deadly force actually
existed....
The other word of importance is "necessary," and this is perhaps the
most important word in these statutes. We have no intention of granting
people a license to execute other people when it is not necessary. Generally
speaking, this means that deadly force must be the only viable remedy
under the circumstances.
Legis. Rec. 788 (Ist Spec. Sess. 1976) (statement of Sen. Collins).
50. See Rosen, supra note 44, at 21.
51. Id.
52. 381 A.2d 652 (Me. 1978).
53. Beginning in 1972, for the first time in the history of the State of Maine, the
criminal laws of Maine were systematically rewritten. MAIm CumsnaL LAw REvmSION
COMMHSSION, INMODUCTION To Accoh'ANY THE MAimNE CRumiAL CODE, at 3 (1975).
One of the central accomplishments of the Maine Code was, as the Commission
itself described, "the articulation of vitally important rules of law that have tradition-
ally been left unexpressed by legislative enactments and only incompletely developed
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forcement was State v. Austin. Austin considered the asserted right,
under section 108, " of a free citizen to use non-deadly force to resist
an arrest by a law enforcement officer. In a unanimous opinion, the
Law Court held that the Legislature did not intend to give a person
the right to resist a law enforcement officer's use of reasonable, non-
deadly force to effect an arrest, whether legal or illegal. 5 Austin is
instructive not only for the result it achieved-the elimination of
the common law right to resist arrest in certain circumstances-but
also for its treatment of the justification provisions, interpreting
them within the context of the Maine Criminal Code as a whole.
1. The Case
At approximately 1:00 a.m. on July 11, 1976, two officers from the
Town of Mexico Police Department in Maine were investigating
complaints of loud noises being made by persons leaving a local
lounge around closing time. The officers were stationed across from
the lounge when one of them heard someone leaving the lounge
shout an obscene name. As the same person repeated the name
twice more, the officer was able to single him out. The officer heard
the obscenity called out once more and observed Preston P. Austin
point his hand directly at the police cruiser and call out another
obscene name. The officer then got out of the cruiser and ap-
proached Austin, advising him that he was under arrest for disor-
derly conduct.56
After attempts to handcuff Austin failed, a second officer provided
assistance by carrying Austin to the car where the officers, working
together, were able to handcuff the arrestee. As the two policemen
placed Austin in the cruiser, Austin kicked one of them in the thigh.
On the ride to the station, Austin kicked the other officer in the
head. Austin was charged with disorderly conduct and two counts of
assault. Following a jury trial, he was found guilty on both assault
charges, but was acquitted of the disorderly conduct charge. 7
On appeal, the Law Court unanimously affirmed the judgments of
conviction. The court took as its starting point the "thrust of de-
fendant's arguments on appeal," that is, "his asserted right to resist
an illegal arrest with force." ' The court noted that prior to May 1,
1976 (the effective date of the Maine Criminal Code), Maine fol-
by the process of judicial decisions." Id. One example of this new articulation is rep-
resented by what was chapter 3 of the Proposed Code and is now chapter 5 of the
Maine Criminal Code-the justification provisions.
54. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 108 (West 1983). See infra note 64 and ac-
companying text.
55. State v. Austin, 381 A.2d at 654.
56. Id. at 653.
57. Id. at 652-53.
58. Id. at 653.
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lowed the prevailing common law rule embodied in State v. Robin-
son, 9 which provided that, "[an illegal arrest is an assault and bat-
tery. The person so attempted to be restrained of his liberty has the
same right, and only the same right, to use force in defending him-
self as he would have in repelling any other assault and battery."0
Having taken note of the prior law under Robinson, the court
went on to reject it: "[r]eading the provisions of the Criminal Code
as a whole shows . . . that Robinson no longer states the law of
Maine."'" According to the Law Court, with the enactment of the
Criminal Code came specific provisions addressing the right to resist
an arrest that were to be taken as comprehensive.02
The court began its analysis of the specific Code provisions by set-
ting forth, in relevant part, the language of the applicable sections of
the Code. First, the court cited section 107(1) (A) which states that a
law enforcement officer is justified in using a reasonable degree of
non-deadly force upon another person "[w]hen and to the extent
that he reasonably believes it necessary to effect an arrest or to pre-
vent the escape from custody of an arrested person, unless he knows
that the arrest or detention is illegal."' 3
The court then drew upon the language of section 108, again pro-
viding emphasis:
[a] person is justified in using a reasonable degree of nondeadly
force upon another person in order to defend himself or a 3rd per-
son from what he reasonably believes to be the imminent use of
unlawful, nondeadly force by such other person, and he may use a
degree of such force which he reasonably believes to be necessary
for such purpose.6
Finally, the court cited section 752, which made a person guilty of
assaulting an officer if the person "knowingly assaults a law enforce-
ment officer while the officer is engaged in the performance of his
official duties."6 5 The comment to that section, also reproduced by
the court in the Austin opinion, stated as follows:
59. 145 Me. 77, 81, 72 A.2d 260, 262 (1950).
60. Id. at 81, 72 A.2d at 262.
61. State v. Austin, 381 A.2d at 653.
62. Id. at 654.
63. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ms. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 107(l)(A)
(West 1983)).
64. State v. Austin, 381 A.2d at 654 (alteration in original) (quoting M. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 108(1) (West 1983)).
65. M .REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 752 (repealed 1977). The substance of § 752
was re-enacted in § 752-A. Section 752 proscribed knowing assaults upon a law en-
forcement officer while the officer was engaged in the performance of his or her offi-
cial duties. The revised statute expands the culpable state of mind requirement and
narrows the illegal conduct reached. Section 752 prohibited knowing assaults, that is,
acts causing bodily injury or offensive physical contact. Section 752-A prohibits the
causing of bodily injury by one acting intentionally, knowingly or reckle.sly. IL R L.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 752-A (West 1983 & Supp. 1992-1993).
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The policy here is to discourage people in custody from a violent
response to what they see as an illegal arrest. The second rule is
that if, in making the arrest, the officer uses more force than the
law allows him, the victim of that excessive force commits no crime
if he defends himself from it."
The court found that these provisions, taken together, made clear
that "the legislature did not intend section 108 to give a person the
right to resist a law enforcement officer's use of reasonable,
nondeadly force to effect an arrest, whether legal or illegal." 7 The
court supported this conclusion through an analysis that began with
an examination of section 107.68
Section 107, stated the court, provides a justification for a police
officer to use a reasonable degree of non-deadly force to effect an
arrest when the officer reasonably believes it necessary.0, The court
noted that the only exception to this justification was in circum-
stances when the officer knows the arrest or detention is illegal.70
The practical consequence of the provision, the court concluded, was
that there would be instances when an arrest ultimately turned out
to have been illegal, but because an officer did not know of its ille-
gality at the time of the arrest, that officer would be ]ustified in us-
ing a reasonable degree of non-deadly force to effect the arrest.7 1
The court then turned to section 752(2), which, in conjunction
with section 207,72 prohibited an arrestee from knowingly "causing
bodily injury or offensive physical contact" to the arresting officer.73
Drawing on the comment to section 752, the court observed that the
Legislature had expressly intended the section to deter a violent re-
sponse by an individual to an arrest perceived as illegal. 74
The court then turned back to section 108, noting that the sec-
tion's language, while allowing a private person the use of reasona-
ble, non-deadly force, limits a person to defending himself "from
what he reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful,
nondeadly force by such other person."' 75 The court reasoned that to
find that such justification extended to resisting an illegal arrest
would contradict the legislative intent behind sections 107 and
66. State v. Austin, 381 A.2d at 654 (alteration in original) (quoting Comment to
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 752-A (repealed 1977)).
67. State v. Austin, 381 A.2d at 654.
68. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 107 (West 1983 & Supp. 1992-1993).
69. State v. Austin, 381 A.2d at 654.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 207 (West 1983 & Supp. 1992-1993).
73. State v. Austin, 381 A.2d at 654.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 654-55 (alteration in original) (quoting ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§ 108(1) (West 1983)).
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752.6 Rather, the court stated, the justification of section 108 de-
pends upon the unlawfulness of the force, not the illegality of the
arrest.7 7 Hence, though an arrest may be illegal, it is still lawful
under section 107 unless the officer uses excessive force or the officer
knows that the arrest is illegal.78
2. Analysis
The Law Court made clear that the approach it employed sought
to give effect to the legislative intent behind the inclusion of the
justification provisions in the Maine Criminal Code. The court's rea-
soning provides a paradigmatic example of the balancing of compet-
ing interests that constitutes the defining exercise of a doctrine of
justification.7 The court was engaged in exactly this balancing when
it wrote that the Code provisions, taken as an "integrated whole,"
establish that
[i]n general, under the code a person being arrested must not re-
spond violently. On the other hand, a police officer is given sub-
stantial leeway in using nondeadly force in making an ar-
rest-namely, that amount he reasonably believes necessary to
make the arrest-provided he does not know the arrest is illegal.
Section 108 gives the arrested person a right of self-defense against
unlawful or excessive force used by the police officer; but if he re-
acts violently to nondeadly force applied by the police, he takes his
chances on being able later to show the officer was not justified
under section 107.80
Austin represents a complex weighing of interests-those of effec-
tive law enforcement and those of the bodily integrity of the arres-
tee. The policy choice of Austin is clear: The interests of effective
law enforcement outweigh a person's interest in resisting what he or
she perceives to be, and may in fact be, an illegal arrest"1 The
76. State v. Austin, 381 A.2d at 655.
77. Id.
78. Even if the arrested person is later able to establish the unlawfulness of the
officer's use of force, he loses his justification if he is the initial aggressor, or the
provoker, of the unlawful force under the circumstances defined by § 108 of the
Code. The relevant language of § 108(1) states:
However, such force is not justifiable if:
A. With a purpose to cause physical harm to another person, he provoked
the use of unlawful, nondeadly force by such other person; or
B. He was the initial aggressor, unless after such aggression he withdraws
from the encounter and effectively communicates to such other person his
intent to do so, but the latter notwithstanding continues the use or threat
of unlawful, nondeadly force. ...
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 108(1)(A) & (B) (West 1983).
79. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
80. State v. Austin, 381 A.2d at 655.
81. By 1992 twenty states had, by statute or by state supreme court decisions,
limited the common law right to resist an unlawful arrest. PAUL H- ROBINSON. CRUs-
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proper recourse for the aggrieved individual is, Austin tells us, not
to resort to violent self-help, 2 but rather to obtain release on bail or
personal recognizance, or to seek civil damages. 8 3 As the Austin
court observed: "The legislature has thus cast the advantage on the
side of law enforcement officers, leaving the person arrested in most
cases to pursue his rights, not through violent self-help, but through
prompt hearing before a magistrate with prompt consideration for
release on bail or personal recognizance.""
B. The Hegarty Incident: The Potential Consequences of
Resisting
As Austin counseled, the policy behind the justification provisions
should be one that discourages violent responses to an officer's as-
sertion of authority. When a right to resist is recognized, the result
in cases like Clisham and the Hegarty incident, discussed be-
low-whether or not the resister is "right" in his or her resis-
tance-is an escalation of the conflict.
On Friday, May 15, 1992, four men set up camp at a small private
NAL LAw DEFENSES § 131(e)(3), at 91 & n.80 (1984 & Supp. 1992). Numerous federal
appeals courts have rejected the common law right to resist an unlawful arrest as
well. See, e.g., United States v. Danehy, 680 F.2d 1311, 1315-16 (11th Cir. 1982).
82. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(a)(i) (outlawing the use of force against
a known police officer despite unlawfulness of arrest); People v. Curtis, 450 P.2d 33,
37 (Cal. 1969) (statute forbidding the use of force to resist unlawful arrest by known
police officer withstood constitutional attack that it eliminated the remedy of self-
help against such arrest in violation of Fourth Amendment); State v. Koonce, 214
A.2d 428, 436 (N.J. 1965) (private citizen may not use force to resist arrest by police
officer, whether or not arrest is illegal).
83. State v. Austin, 381 A.2d at 655. See also Ralph D. Smith, Comment, Crimi-
nal Law-Arrest-The Right To Resist Arrest, 7 NAT. RES. J. 119, 120 (1967) (argu-
ing that an arrest should not be forcibly resisted); Max Hochanadel and Harry W.
Stege, Comment Criminal Law: The Right To Resist an Unlawful Arrest: An Out-
dated Concept?, 3 TuLSA L. J. 40, 46 (1966) (contending that the right to resist unlaw-
ful arrest is an outdated concept). But see Paul G. Chevigny, The Right To Resist an
Unlawful Arrest, 78 YALE L.J. 1128 (1969). Chevigny argues that to assert that ade-
quate legal remedies exist to redress police abuses is to misconstrue the rationale of
the right to resist. Chevigny writes, "[ihe right does-not exist to encourage citizens to
resist, but rather to protect those provoked into resistance by unlawful arrests." Id. at
1133-34. Even if the right does not exist to encourage citizens to resist, however, it is
plausible that the existence of the right might have the practical effect of encouraging
a violent response by a person subject to an arrest. Furthermore, Chevigny's argu-
ment assumes that a workable rule can be fashioned to distinguish unlawful arrests
that may properly be resisted from other unlawful arrests. Id. at 1138-50. Chevigny
proposes a right which depends on how patently false the arrest is and the degree of
provocation it causes the person subject to the authority. Id. at 1141.
The Law Court in Austin rejected the Chevigny approach to the right to resist
arrest. To the extent that the Austin court preserved the common law right to resist,
it is within the context of the justification provisions of the Code as a whole and
subject to § 107. State v. Austin, 381 A.2d at 655.
84. State v. Austin, 381 A.2d at 655 (footnote omitted).
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campsite outside the town of Jackman, Maine. 8 After a day of fish-
ing, all four of the campers returned to the campsite, and after hav-
ing finished their dinner, were met by Katherine Hegarty. Hegarty,
whose house was about 185 feet from the campsite, repeatedly asked
the men where they had gotten the key to her gate. She believed
that the men had wrecked her gate by forcing the key, and told
them, "[T]his is my house and you're invading my privacy."8 0 The
men offered to leave in the morning. Hegarty threatened the camp-
ers and, after entering her house, came out and fired a gun in their
direction. In total, Hegarty shot approximately thirty rounds in the
direction of the campers.8 7
Having successfully escaped the camping area, the four campers
reported the incident to the Somerset County Sheriff's Office. In re-
sponse to the call, four officers met with the campers and then de-
cided to proceed to the camp to arrest Mrs. Hegarty. When they
arrived, Hegarty told them that they were unlawfully on her prop-
erty and could not rightfully enter her home. She warned the of-
ficers, "[Y]ou don't have a right to be on my property," "Get out of
here," and "You're not coming in here." 8 After attempts to draw
Hegarty from her house failed, the officers positioned themselves
around her camp and forcefully entered. While the officers were
making entry, however, Mrs. Hegarty had armed herself. One of the
officers witnessed Hegarty raise her gun and begin to move it in the
direction of two of the other officers. Two of the officers yelled at
her three times to put the gun down. When Hegarty failed to com-
ply, three of the officers, almost simultaneously, fired what proved to
be fatal shots."8
The Hegarty incident demonstrates the potential consequences of
the conflict between a reading of the justification provisions that al-
lows a citizen to use force against a police officer, on the one hand,
and the justified use of deadly force by police officers under section
107, on the other. Katherine Hegarty, no less than Andrew Clisham,
may have thought herself justified in using force against the police
officers to defend her home. Indeed, after Clisham, it is possible that
Hegarty would have had a viable defense to a criminal prosecution 0
under section 104. After all, in Hegarty's case, as in Clisham's, the
officers had no warrant and no consent was given for the search.01
85. The facts set forth here are drawn from the press release of June 3. 1992,
issued from the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Maine. See M&. DEPT
OF Arr'y GErN., ATToRNEY GENEAL REsPONDS To HEGARTY SHOOTING, Statement of
Facts 1 (June 3, 1992) [hereinafter RELP-E].
86. Id. at 2.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 11.
89. Id. at 11-12.
90. See discussion supra part II.
91. Of note in this regard is the second claim for relief filed on behalf of the Es-
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Arguably, in Hegarty's case, no less than in Clisham's, exigent cir-
cumstances did not exist. Therefore, absent probable cause, under
the Clisham court's rationale, Hegarty would have been justified in
using a reasonable degree of non-deadly force to prevent the officers'
criminal trespass.92
It is uncertain whether Katherine Hegarty made a considered de-
cision to assert her right to resist violently what she perceived to be
an unlawful search of her home. It is probable, however, that to the
extent persons are aware that such a right exists, the likelihood of
its exercise is increased. The exercise of that right could mean the
loss of life-of the person resisting, or of the police officer.
V. THE NEED To RECONCILE JUSTIFIED FORCE To RESIST AN
ARREST AND JUSTIFIED FORCE To RESIST A SEARCH OR A SEIZURE
The result reached in Clisham is inconsistent with the case law in
Maine and the justification provisions of the Maine Criminal Code.
A basic tenet of the criminal justice system should be that its laws
not encourage violence. In the context of the justification provisions,
such a belief simply reflects an awareness that: (1) the citizen who
responds with violence has no sound method of gauging the legality
of his or her conduct (the response is at best a guess that the search
would be unlawful); (2) there is a conflict between the use of force
legally permitted an officer seeking to perform his or her duties, and
that allowed the resisting citizen; and (3) the right of an individual
to expel a police officer from his or her premises does not accomplish
its purpose, since it serves only to escalate the conflict and ulti-
mately causes the citizen to be lawfully arrested for the results of his
or her forceful response.
tate of Katherine A. Hegarty, which alleges, in part, that the defendants violated M&
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 104 & 107 (West 1983 & Supp. 1992-1993). Hegarty v.
Somerset County, United States District Court (Me.), Civil Docket No. 93-004-B
[hereinafter Complaint]. The factual allegations of the Complaint assert that "[tihe
five police officers had not obtained or initiated any proceedings to obtain a warrant
to arrest Katherine Hegarty or to enter Hegarty's house," and that "[t]here was no
emergency or imminent threat to the safety of the police or public when Hines broke
into the Hegartys' house." Id. at 6. Since Katherine Hegarty did not give her consent
to the officers to enter her premises, the warrantless search of her house was con-
ducted under substantially the same circumstances as the warrantless search in
Clisham would have been. State v. Clisham, 614 A.2d 1297, 1299 (Me. 1992).
92. It may be argued that a distinction between the Hegarty incident and the
Clisham facts can be drawn on the basis of the absence or presence of probable cause
for the search. To make that distinction, however, is to point to the flaw in the
Clisham result. Both Katherine Hegarty and Andrew Clisham were defending their
homes from what they perceived to be an unlawful entry. As a policy matter, it is
absurd to say that whether they were entitled to a § 104 justification defense de-
pends upon whether they had guessed correctly that there was no probable cause for




Clisham is clearly wrong as a policy matter. It ignores the message
of cases like Austin that recognize the danger posed by a citizen's
violent response to officers acting in the performance of their duties.
To read the justification provisions as the Clisham court did is, at
least indirectly, to encourage violent responses to law enforcement
activity. Issues such as the legality of an arrest, the constitutionality
of a search,93 and the presence or absence of probable cause and
exigent circumstances should be argued and decided in a court of
law or through some other orderly process. These are not questions
that should be resolved at the end of a gun barrel or the blade of a
knife.
It is equally apparent that Clisham is susceptible to attack strictly
on legal grounds. As a preliminary matter, section 104 allows force
to be used to "prevent or terminate the commission of a criminal
trespass."'" That the officers, simply by approaching the house and
investigating the call, were not criminal trespassers, is clear. 5 The
Clisham court reasoned that absent exigent circumstances or con-
sent, a warrantless search inside Clisham's home would have been
unconstitutional."' Therefore, stated the court, a forced entry would
have constituted a criminal trespass.07 While the court treated its
93. Some courts have restricted a citizen's right to resist an arguably illegal
search. See United States v. Woodring, 536 F.2d 598, 599-600 (5th Cir. 1976) (no
right to resist police authority to search); United States v. Ferrons, 438 F.2d 381, 389-
90 (3d Cir. 1971) ("a person does not have a right to forcibly resist the execution of a
search warrant by a peace officer or government agent, even though that warrant may
subsequently be held to be invalid"); State v. Blackman, 617 A.2d 619, 629-32 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1992) (no privilege to resist a police frisk even if the frisk would have
been unlawful); State v. Doe, 583 P.2d 464, 466-67 (N.M. 1978) (even if arrest was
unlawful person cannot use force to resist search by officer made in good faith); State
v. Hatton, 568 P.2d 1040, 1045-46 (Ariz. 1977) (no right to resist search warrant later
found to be illegal).
94. MF. REv. STAT. ANN. tit 17-A, § 104(1) (West 1983).
95. See State v. Cloutier, 544 A.2d 1277, 1280 (Me. 1988) (a policeman, entering
onto walkway of house on the basis of a suspicion held in good faith, comes within an
implied invitation of the owner).
96. State v. Clisham, 614 A.2d at 1299.
97. Id. Once it is accepted that police actions constitute a criminal trespass, a
situation invoking Ma Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 104(3) (West 1983) and justifying
the use of deadly force against police officers is at least conceivable. Section 104(3)
reads:
3. A person in possession or control of a dwelling place or a person who is
licensed or privileged to be therein is justified in using deadly force upon
another.
B. When he reasonably believes that deadly force is necessary to prevent
or terminate the commission of a criminal trespass by such other person,
who he reasonably believes:
(1) Has entered or is attempting to enter the dwelling place or has sur-
reptitiously remained within the dwelling place without a license or privi-
lege to do so; and
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conclusion as following from State v. Boilard,98 this is clearly not
the case."' Since the Law Court in Boilard did not reach the ques-
tion of the applicability of section 104, an inquiry into whether the
police entry in that case would have constituted a criminal trespass
was unnecessary and indeed was considered to be so by all but the
dissent in that case.'00
By relying on Boilard for the proposition that the action of the
police officers was unconstitutional, and therefore criminal, the
Clisham court avoided a consideration of the actual legal standard
(2) Is committing or is likely to commit some other crime within the
dwelling place.
Indeed, the argument by Clisham to the superior court, renewed on appeal to the
Law Court, was that § 104(3)(B) applied. State v. Clisham, 614 A.2d at 1298. Clisham
contended that he reasonably believed that the police were likely to commit the
crimes of violation of privacy, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 511 (West 1983), and
criminal restraint, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 302 (West 1983), within the dwell-
ing place once they had entered. State v. Clisham, 614 A.2d at 1298.
98. 488 A.2d 1380 (Me. 1985).
99. The Clisham court's use of Boilard is ironic. In Boilard, although the court
found that the police officer's forceful entry into the Boilard home constituted a civil
trespass and was illegal, the evidence of the criminal acts committed by Boilard fol-
lowing the entry was not suppressed. The Law Court held that, "[d]espite the illegal-
ity of the entry into Boilard's home, it is beyond question that the exclusionary rule
does not extend to suppress evidence of independent crimes taking place as a reaction
to an unlawful arrest or search." State v. Boilard, 488 A.2d at 1386-87. The Boilard
court quoted with approval an Oregon court of appeals case, State v. Burger, 639 P.2d
706, 708 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) which stated:
We decline to hold that after an unlawful entry evidence of subsequent
crimes committed against police officers must be suppressed. Such a rule
would produce intolerable results. For example, a person who correctly be-
lieved that his home had been unlawfully entered by the police could re-
spond with unlimited force and, under the exclusionary rule, could be effec-
tively immunized from criminal responsibility for any action taken after
that entry. We do not believe that either the state or federal constitution
compels such a result.
State v. Boilard, 488 A.2d at 1387. See also State v. Kittleson, 305 N.W.2d 787, 789
(Minn. 1981) (exclusionary rule does not require suppression of evidence of assault on
officer even if police entry was in violation of Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573
(1980)); Commonwealth v. Saia, 360 N.E.2d 329, 332 (Mass. 1977) (even assuming the
illegality of a police entry into a private dwelling, the exclusionary rule does not oper-
ate to suppress evidence of an assault and battery on the police officers following the
entry).
100. Five of the six justices on the Boilard court appended a concurring opinion
stating that the defendant never raised the issue of § 104 justification and that fail-
ure to do so "was not so obviously wrong that the court below should have intervened
to overrule counsel's choice of defense tactics, by giving the instruction on its own
initiative." Id. at 1391. Justice Dufresne, in the part of his opinion not joined by his
colleagues, would have vacated the convictions on the ground that the jury was not
properly instructed that, if they found the officer to be a criminal trespasser, Boilard
could have used reasonable force in ejecting him from his home under § 104(1). State
v. Boilard, 488 A.2d at 1387-90.
[Vol. 45:385
MAINE'S JUSTIFICATION PROVISION
supplied by the criminal trespass statute. °1 In order to satisfy the
culpable state of mind requirement of the statute, the officers would
have had to know that they had no license or privilege to enter upon
the property. It is far from clear that such a finding could be
made."0 2 Certainly, the officers were acting within the normal scope
of their powers. 10
3
Further, in finding that section 104 does not differentiate between
private citizens and police officers, the court's approach runs counter
to one which envisions the Criminal Code as an integrated and co-
herent whole. The tension between the Clisham court's application
of section 104 and other provisions of the Criminal Code is particu-
larly acute with regard to section 107 and the Legislature's grant to
police officers of the right to use force in the performance of their
duties.0'o
In Clisham the defendant was wielding two large hunting
knives'0° and could just as easily have been holding a gun. He
threatened that he had used the knives before, and claimed profi-
ciency in throwing them.108 Suppose Clisham had made a sudden
movement toward the officers and one or both of them had shot
Clisham. It is likely that the officers in that situation would be justi-
fied in the use of deadly force under section 107(2)(A).' 7 A policy
101. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 402 (West Supp. 1992-1993) provides in
part-
1. A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, knowing that that person is not
licensed or privileged to do so, that person:
A. Enters any dwelling place;
D. Remains in any place in defiance of a lawful order to leave that %s
personally communicated to that person by the owner or another author-
ized person ....
102. A finding in this regard would require an inquiry into the state of mind of
the officers. See State v. Dansinger, 521 A.2d 685, 689 (Me. 1987) ("the issue of li-
cense or privilege necessarily involves the state of mind of the Defendants...".
Such an inquiry did not occur either at the trial level or on appeal.
103. See, e.g., State v. Judkins, 440 A.2d 355, 358 (Me. 1982) ("Clearly an officer
may be acting within the scope of his official duties ... even while making an illegal
arrest").
104. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 107 (West 1983 & Supp. 1992-1993).
105. State v. Clisham, 614 A.2d at 1298.
106. Id. See State's Brief, supra note 3, at 4.
107. Though the Clisham court, under the authority of State v. Williams, 433
A 2d 765, 768-70 (Me. 1978), and the Model Penal Code, found that Clisham's
threatened use of deadly force was tantamount to the use of non-deadly force, the
officers may nevertheless have been justified in responding with deadly force. Section
107 leaves such a possibility open. See ME. Rev. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 107(2)(A)
(West 1983 & Supp. 1992-1993); supra note 10 and accompanying text for the lan-
guage of § 107(2)(A); MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.11 note 9 (1962) ("Although the actor
who threatens deadly force is not considered to have used deadly force, it may be
noted that under other sections of Article 3 a threat to use deadly force may some-
times give rise to the permissible use of responsive deadly force.")
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that allows an individual such as Clisham to threaten deadly force,
while at the same time authorizing officers to respond with force of
their own, only creates an escalating confrontation. 0 8 The Legisla-
ture could not have intended such a result.10 9 While the approach of
the Law Court to statutory interpretation has generally been to give
statutes their ordinary meaning from the language that the Legisla-
ture used,110 such an analytical starting point does not preclude a
finding that the purpose of section 104 is only served when a differ-
entiation between private persons and law enforcement officials is
made. The fact that such a differentiation does not exist on the face
of the provision is surely not dispositive, particularly where the fail-
ure to find such a distinction results in an internally inconsistent
criminal code. Austin so holds."' In Clisham, as in Austin, the rec-
ognition of the right to respond violently to a police officer is con-
trary to the tenor of section 752-A1 2 and to the prerogative granted
If the officers had shot Clisham, and their belief in the necessity of using deadly
force, or the imminency of the use of deadly force against them, was found not to be
reasonable, they would still be afforded the justification of § 107 as long as holding
the belief was not itself reckless or criminally negligent. Furthermore, even if the
belief were found to be reckless or criminally negligent, the officers could only be
convicted of a crime for which recklessness or criminal negligence suffices. ME. RE.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A § 101(3) (West 1983); supra note 33 for the pertinent language of
§ 101. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 528 A.2d 1267, 1269-70 (Me. 1987) (operation of § 101
in the context of a self-defense claim in an assault case); State v. Lagasse, 410 A.2d
537, 543 (Me. 1980) (operation of § 101 in the context of a self-defense claim in a
manslaughter case).
108. While the hypothetical posited above has the officers responding with deadly
force, it is also possible that they could respond with non-deadly force. Section 107
(1)(B) of the Maine Criminal Code allows an arresting officer to defend herself or a
third person from what she reasonably believes is the imminent use of non-deadly
force. See State v. Judkins, 440 A.2d 355 (Me. 1982). Nevertheless, whether the re-
sponse is with deadly force or non-deadly force, the result is an escalation of the
conflict.
109. To the extent that the purpose of § 104 was discussed by the Maine Legisla-
ture, it was in the context of justifying the use of force by a homeowner to repel a
burglar. Representative of this discussion are some of the statements made on the
House floor discussing why § 104 was drafted:
The situation that it [§ 104] was drafted to deal with is a situation that
has been discussed across the state where a person enters the dwelling
which is occupied, for example, by a single person .... The person who is
in the house committing the crime says .... You have no reason to be
afraid, I am not going to hurt you but I am going to rob you and burglarize
the house. Or, another situation would be where a person came into the
house and said, we are not going to hurt you but we have a truck here and
we are just moving out all of your stuff.
3 Legis. Rec. 852 (1st Spec. Sess. 1976) (statement of Rep. Spencer).
110. See State v. Vainio, 466 A.2d 471, 474 (Me. 1983) ("The starting point in any
given case concerning the interpretation of a statute must be the language of the
statute itself.").
111. See supra part IV.A.
112. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 752-A (West 1983 & Supp. 1992-1993).
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police officers by section 107.113
Vt A PROPOSAL FOR STATUTORY RECONCuATION
The proposed legislation set forth below seeks to differentiate be-
tween police officers and ordinary citizens under section 104.11" This
distinction is intended to resolve the conflict between section 104, as
interpreted by the Law Court in State v. Clisham, and section 107,
which justifies the use of force by a police officer in the performance
of his or her official duties."1 5 In so doing, the legislation would make
Maine law regarding resistance to searches and seizures consistent
with that governing the use of force allowed in order to resist an
arrest. To make the other justification provisions consistent with the
proposed change in section 104, section 105 should be similarly
modified.
While the adoption of these modifications should not depend on
the implementation of the suggestions of the Attorney General's
Task Force on the Use of Force,11 6 the Legislature and the Board of
Trustees of the Maine Criminal Justice Academy should consider
the Task Force recommendations together with a statutory change.
Section 104 appears below with the Author's proposed additions un-
derlined. Section 104-A with Comment follows and is the Author's
proposed statutory addition.
CHAPTER 5
DEFENSES AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES;
JUSTIFICATION
§ 104. Use of force in defense of premises
1. Except as provided in section 104-A, [a] person in possession or
control of premises or a person who is licensed or privileged to be
thereon is justified in using nondeadly force upon another when and
to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to prevent or
terminate the commission of a criminal trespass by such other in or
upon such premises.
2. A person in possession or control of premises or a person who is
licensed or privileged to be thereon is justified in using deadly force
upon another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it
necessary to prevent an attempt by the other to commit arson.
3. Except as provided in section 104-A, [a] person in possession or
control of a dwelling place or person who is licensed or privileged to
113. M&. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 107 (West 1983 & Supp. 1992-1993). See
supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
114. Ma. Rxv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 104 (West 1983).
115. M&. Rnv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 107 (West 1983 & Supp. 1992-1993).
116. See Ma DEP'T OF ATr'y GEN., ArroRNEY GENERAL'S TASK FoRcE ON THE UsE




be therein is justified in using deadly force upon another:
A. Under the circumstances enumerated in section 108; or
B. When he reasonably believes that deadly force is necessary to
prevent or terminate the commission of a criminal trespass by such
other person, who he reasonably believes:
(1) Has entered or is attempting to enter the dwelling place or
has surreptitiously remained within the dwelling place without a li-
cense or privilege to do so; and
(2) Is committing or is likely to commit some other crime
within the dwelling place.
4. A person may use deadly force under subsection 3, paragraph
B, only if he first demands the person against whom such deadly
force is to be used to terminate the criminal trespass and the other
person fails to immediately comply with the demand, unless he rea-
sonably believes that it would be dangerous to himself or another to
make the demand.
5. As used in this section:
A. Dwelling place has the same meaning provided in section 2,
subsection 10; and
B. Premises includes, but is not limited to, lands, private ways
and any buildings or structures thereon.
§ 104-A. Limitation on the use of force against a law en-
forcement officer engaged in a search or a seizure
1. A person is not justified in using force against a law enforce-
ment officer engaged in a search or a seizure if:
(A) The officer has made reasonable efforts to advise the person
that the officer is a law enforcement officer acting in accordance with
that officer's duty;
(B) The person knows or has reason to know that the officer is a
law enforcement officer acting in accordance with that officer's duty;
(C) The officer acts in good faith; and
(D) The officer does not use unlawful force in carrying out the
search or seizure.
Comment
This section is designed to limit the use of permissible force
against a law enforcement officer when that officer is engaged in
the performance of his or her official duties in conducting a search
or a seizure. More specifically, it is intended to overrule the result
in State v. Clisham, 614 A.2d 1297 (Me. 1992), and a reading of
section 104 that allows for a violent response by a private citizen to
a nonconsensual search by a police officer.
Subsection (1)(A) of this section, like subsection 107(2)(B)(1),
contains a requirement that the officer make reasonable efforts to
advise the person that he or she is a law enforcement officer acting
in accordance with his or her official duties. If the person subject to
the officer's authority knows or has reason to know that this is in
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fact the case, that person would be denied a defense under section
104 or 105 if he or she threatened to use, or actually used, force
against the officer. Under subsection (1)(C) the officer must have
acted in good faith in initiating the search or the seizure.
The statute leaves intact, in subsection (1)(D), the right of self-
defense allowed a citizen under section 108 against unlawful or ex-
cessive force used by the officer. The person takes his or her
chances, however, on later being able to show that the officer was
not justified under section 107. State v. Austin, 381 A.2d 652 (Me.
1978).
VII. CONTROLLING POLICE CoNDucTl ALTERNATIVES TO
AUTHORIZING A VIOLENT RESPONSE TO POLICE AUTHORITY
Arguably, it was the perception that police officers are not respon-
sibly exercising their prerogatives that spawned the Clisham re-
sult.11 If, for example, police departments are not providing for ad-
ministrative discipline, and inadequate training is resulting in poor
police procedure, the argument in support of the right to resist what
one perceives to be an illegal exercise of police authority becomes
more attractive.118
In one of the leading articles espousing the right to resist an ar-
rest, Paul Chevigny writes that the arguments of the critics of the
right can be reduced to one central point: "[C]onstituted authority
is now sufficiently civilized that citizens should deal with it peace-
fully. Violence only encourages disrespect for the law."'110 That char-
acterization, while perhaps a bit simplistic, is not unfair. An under-
lying premise of cases such as Austin is that the police can be
trusted in the overwhelming majority of cases to "exercise their
code-granted prerogatives with restraint . . .. ,"I" Thus, with so
much dependent upon the integrity of police action, Mr. Chevigny's
observation becomes particularly interesting in this post-Rodney
King era12 1 and in light of the Katherine Hegarty incident.
117. This seems at least to have been the perception of Andrew Clisham's lawyer,
Wayne Foote. See Court Rules Threat Was Justified, PoRTLA PaS HRALD, Oct.
8, 1992, at 4B. The article said of Mr. Foote, "he hopes it [the Clisham case] will
cause police to think twice before searching people's homes illegally." Id. Foote was
quoted as saying, "I would hope that it keeps police from doing this sort of thing but
I don't know that I have any confidence that this will happen. Nothing happened to
the police officers and my client went to jail." Id.
118. See Chevigny supra note 83, at 1134-35. Assuming arguendo the theory that
other remedies may be substituted for the right to resist, Chevigny observes that "the
rationale of the right is not undermined unless those alternative remedies are real
ones." Id. at 1134. This, however, is perhaps a better argument for the strengthening
of alternative remedies than for an adherence to the common law right.
119. Id. at 1136.
120. State v. Austin, 381 A.2d at 655.
121. On March 3, 1991, Los Angeles police beat a black man, Rodney King, who
had been stopped following a high-speed chase. The beating was captured on video-
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A. Returning to the Hegarty Incident: Focusing Attention on
,the Integrity of the System
The Hegarty incident, in particular the actions of the police of-
ficers involved in the shooting, led to significant public outcry122 and
an investigation by the State Attorney General's Office. Following
the investigation, Attorney General Michael Carpenter released a
statement on June 3, 1992, declining to pursue criminal charges
against the police officers.
123
The decision not to prosecute effectively released the officers from
criminal liability.124 While reasonable prosecutors could have dis-
tape by a bystander and was widely broadcast by the media. The incident focused
public attention on violence used by police forces. Paul Chevigny, Let's Make It A
Federal Case, THE NATION 370 (March 23, 1992).
122. See Answers Sought in Police Shooting, PORTLAND PREsS HERALD, May 19,
1992, at 3B; Shooting of Woman by Police Questioned, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD,
May 21, 1992, at 1A, 8A.
123. See RELEASE, supra note 85, at 1.
124. This decision did not, of course, foreclose a federal prosecution. See Tess
Nacelewicz, U.S. Official Probes Hegarty Case, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, July 30,
1992, at 1A, 10A. The U.S. Attorney's Office, however, made a decision not to
prosecute.
Paul Chevigny has written an interesting article on the role of-the federal govern-
ment in stopping local police brutality. See Chevigny, supra note 121, at 370. Written
just over a year after the Rodney King incident, the article is concerned primarily
with federal intervention to stop patterns of misconduct at local levels.
Early in his article, Chevigny describes with approval the international standards
for law enforcement developed at the United Nations. These standards, Chevigny
notes, "mandate effective reporting and review procedures for incidents of injury and
death." Id. Contrasting this with the federal system of the United States, Chevigny
writes of the latter, "Although the Constitution also sets some general limits on offi-
cials' use of force, the federal government does not monitor local compliance even
with constitutional, not to speak of international, standards; there are, for example,
no federal 'reporting and review' procedures for local police violence." Id. at 370.
Chevigny suggests that various federal agencies, including the Bureau of Justice
Statistics, collect and publish data regarding police violence on local levels. The fed-
eral government, he asserts, could collect information "on the number and type of
citizen complaints against the police; on officers disciplined by departments and the
nature of their offenses; on the number of officers prosecuted for local crimes; and on
systems of review, command-control and accountability within local departments."
Id. at 371.
Armed with the knowledge acquired from the gathering of these statistics and in-
formation, Chevigny proposes that the federal government do two things:
1) When the Justice Department is satisfied that there is a widespread and
continuous pattern of the use of excessive force or other violation of basic
rights, federal funding to the local police authority should be terminated.
There should be a hearing procedure to determine the facts, as there is
under the present system when a department is accused of discrimination.
2) When resources supplied under a federal program have themselves been
used in connection with acts of police brutality, an equivalent sum should
be returned to the government.
Id. at 372.
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agreed on whether or not to prosecute, " " the Attorney General's re-
liance on section 107126 in the exercise of his discretion is not with-
out foundation in the language of that provision. 27 Clearly, the
practical implications of the existence of a justification provision
such as section 107 can be quite significant. Not only does the provi-
sion operate to vindicate what would otherwise be a criminal act,12
but such a decision also has the effect of focusing attention on the
integrity of the system upon which the justification would operate.
Hence, while the Attorney General's decision whether to prosecute
was probably the most eagerly anticipated result of his investigation,
the statement issued by his office is perhaps more remarkable for its
criticism of the actions taken by the officers than for the ultimate
decision not to prosecute. 129 In fact, the majority of the substantive
125. See 300 Protest Sheriffs Lack of Action, PoRTLmD Pass HERALD, July 2,
1992, at 2B (David Crook, district attorney for Somerset and Kennebec counties, rec-
ommending that a grand jury investigate the shooting); District Attorney Joins
Hegarty Protesters, PoRTLAm PRass HERALD, July 6, 1992, at 3B (Crook joins those
protesting Attorney General Michael Carpenter's decision not to prosecute the
officers).
126. See RELEAE , supra note 85.
127. On an administrative level, the Sheriff of Somerset County absolved his of-
ficers of any blame in the shooting. See Somerset Sheriff Clears Officers in Hegarty
Death, PoRTLAND PREss HERALD, July 1, 1992, at 1A, 10A.
128. The officers and/or their supervisors may still be found to be liable for civil
damages. A civil suit has been filed in connection with the death of Katherine
Hegarty. See Complaint, supra note 91. Named as defendants in the Complaint are:
Somerset County, John Atwood, Commissioner of the Maine Department of Public
Safety;, Andrew E. Demers, Jr., Chief of the Bureau of Maine State Police; Spencer
Havey, Sheriff for Somerset County;, Gary Wright, Maine State Police Trooper, Rene
Guay, Deputy Sheriff for the Somerset County Sheriff's Office; Wilfred Hines, Ser-
geant for the Somerset County Sheriff's Office; Thomas Giroux, Jr., Reserve Officer
for the Somerset County Sheriff's Office; and William Crawford, Jr., Sergeant for the
Somerset County Sheriff's Office. Id. at 2-3. See supra part IV.B. (discussing the role
of the police officers in the shooting).
The Complaint states four claims for relief. The first claims arises under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1983), Complaint at 9; the second arises under the Maine Civil Rights Act,
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4682 (West 1983), Complaint at 9-10; the third is a
wrongful death action under Ma. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-804 (West 1983 &
Supp. 1992-1993), Complaint at 11; and the fourth is a common law trespass claim,
Complaint at 12-13.
129. At one point in the release, the Attorney General wrote:
Despite my decision not to criminally prosecute, I find that the total opera-
tion was avoidable and the officers' conduct was outside the parameters of
responsible, established police procedures. Thus, regarding thq three of-
ficers involved in the shooting, I am recommending to Colonel Demers and
Sheriff Havey that strong disciplinary action be taken up to and including
dismissal ... Although I also question the professional fitness of these
three officers, I do not have the authority to revoke their certification. If I
did, I would so recommend that revocation to the Criminal Justice Acad-
emy Board.of Trustees.
See RELFAE, supra note 85, at 2-3.
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portion of the release is devoted not to the potential criminal liabil-
ity of the officers, but rather to the lack of responsibility demon-
strated by their actions and to ways to prevent future occurrences of
like incidents. Expressing his concern and his intent to take action
of some kind, the Attorney General wrote in the release:
Additionally, my office must take the lead in examining existing
state law, policy, law enforcement procedures and training to mini-
mize the possibility of future tragedy. To that end, I am inviting
the Commissioner of Public Safety, the head of the Maine State
Police and the heads of the Chief of Police and Sheriffs' Associa-
tions to join me on June 10th to begin the process of analyzing
State of Maine law enforcement standards that govern this type of
situation.1 30
The Attorney General's initial response and the entire chain of
events set in motion following the shooting of Katherine Hegarty
can be taken as a functional response to the command of Austin. In
Austin, the court cautioned:
[T]he police should exercise their code-granted prerogatives with
restraint, with police departments using administrative discipline
to assure that individual officers in fact use no more force than
necessary to effect arrests. Violence breeds violence, whoever starts
it.13 1
Austin revealed a certain framework in which the justification
provisions relating to law enforcement activity were to exist. 82 This
framework relied to some extent on the institutional integrity of the
law enforcement system for the proper operation of the code-
granted prerogatives allowing the use of force by officers. The Attor-
ney General's decision not to prosecute was a judgment that the use
of force in the situation presented in the Hegarty incident was such
a code-granted prerogative. Most important, however, this decision
recognized that the legitimacy of these prerogatives depends upon
their responsible exercise.
The Attorney General's approach sought to give proper effect to
the purpose of section 107,131 while at the same time addressing the
rationale that supports the existence of section 107. The method of
analysis employed by the Attorney General recognized that section
107 presupposes a law enforcement system of integrity. This process
and realization is analogous to an approach that views the result in
Clisham as wrong, but seeks to understand its underlying rationale.
Stated differently, if police officers are to be afforded the protection
of section 107, they should exercise that privilege responsibly, as the
130. Id. at 3.
131. State v. Austin, 381 A.2d 652, 655 (Me. 1978).
132. Id. at 653-55. See also discussion supra part IV.A.
133. MF. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 107 (West 1983 & Supp. 1992-1993).
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Law Court in Austin counseled.13 Only then can the system work
properly and with integrity. This rationale holds equally true where
section 104 and the rights of a citizen subject to police authority are
concerned. For an officer to be shielded from a reading of section
104 that allows citizens to respond violently to an officer's assertion
of authority, an officer should act in a manner consistent with the
theory that would warrant that protection.
One approach to remedying abuses by police officers is, in cases
like Austin, to provide for a right to resist arrest; or in cases like
Clisham or the Hegarty incident, to allow for a right to respond vio-
lently to what one perceives to be a criminal trespass by a police
officer. A better approach is one which, in its desire to effect change,
recognizes that violence breeds violence, and that the sys-
tem-which should be made to work with integrity--cannot work at
all if it encourages escalation of conflict.
B. Seeking To Inspire Confidence in the System: The Task
Force Report
One consequence of the Hegarty incident and the resulting inves-
tigation was the creation of the Attorney General's Task Force
("Task Force") 135 and the issuance on November 16, 1992, of its re-
port detailing unanimous findings and recommendations.130 While
the effect of the Task Force recommendations remains to be seen, it
did suggest one means of addressing some of the competing interests
at stake under the justification provisions of the Maine Criminal
Code.
With regard to the current status of the justification provisions of
the Code, "the Task Force concluded that the current statutory pro-
visions offer a proper balance between the rights of a citizen subject
to arrest and the interests of the law enforcement officer who is law-
fully performing his or her duty."1 3 7 The Task Force went on, how-
134. State v. Austin, 381 A.2d at 655.
135. The Task Force was formed as a result of Attorney General Carpenter's
meeting on June 10, 1992, with representatives of various law enforcement agencies.
See supra text accompanying note 130. The membership of the Task Force consisted
of representatives of the Maine Sheriff's Association, the Maine Criminal Justice
Academy, the Maine Chiefs of Police Association, and the Maine State Police, as well
as a legislator, and a member of the public. See Letter from Vendean V. Vafiades to
Michael E. Carpenter, Attorney General of Maine (Nov. 16, 1992) (tranittal letter
for TASK FORCE REPORT) [hereinafter Task Force Transmittal Letter). The Task
Force was chaired by Vendean V. Vafiades, Chief Deputy Attorney General. It did
not conduct an independent review of the Hegarty incident, but instead focused its
research and meetings on "law enforcement training, certification, policy and proce-
dures and the review of Maine law on use of physical force by law enforcement of-
ficers." Id. at 1.
136. See TASK FORCE REPoRT, supra note 116.
137. See Task Force Transmittal Letter, supra note 135, at 2; TASK FoRcE RE-
PORT, supra note 116, at 1-5.
19931
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ever, to say-echoing the sentiment expressed in Austin-that "all
members of the Task Force expressed a strong opinion that law en-
forcement officers must exercise restraint in the use of force, em-
ploying permissible force only when necessary."1 '
Among the findings and recommendations of the Task Force were
several dealing with the training programs for law enforcement of-
ficers in the State of Maine.139 These recommendations, while hardly
revolutionary, are essential to the creation and maintenance of a
process of training and preparation of officers for the performance of
their duties. The public must be secure in its knowledge that this
training is of the highest quality 40 and is regularly reviewed to en-
sure that it retains those standards.141 The recommendations seek to
138. See Task Force Transmittal Letter, supra note 135, at 2.
139. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 116, at 6-12.
140. That a segment of the public does not presently place a great degree of confi-
dence in the training that law enforcement officers in Maine receive is evidenced by
various letters to the editor appearing in the PORTLAm PRESS HERALD on June 18,
1992, approximately two weeks after Attorney General Michael Carpenter's decision
not to prosecute the officers involved in the shooting of Katherine Hegarty. Crime
and Punishment: Shooting Trials Too Much To Take, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD,
June 18, 1992, at 8A. One letter, written by Michael G. McDonough, the Bureau Di-
rector of the Portland Police Department, is representative of the tenor of many of
the others published:
A major variable which leads to such scenarios [as the shooting of Kathe-
rine Hegarty] relates to the totally inadequate training offered to police of-
ficers in this state. It is an absurdity that Maine requires 9 months of train-
ing to become certified as a hairdresser or barber, but only 14 weeks to
become certified to perform one of society's most demanding occupa-
tions-police officer....
Id. See also Randy Wilson, A Death in Temple, MAINE TIMES, Mar. 26, 1993, at 1.
141. Failure to maintain such standards can create civil liability on the part of a
supervisory official or governmental entity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Michael J.
Gerhardt, The Monell Legacy: Balancing Federal Concerns and Municipal Account-
ability Under Section 1983, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 539, 603-613 (1989) (inadequate police
training as a policy or custom involving possible constitutional violation).
A claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has been brought in connection with the
death of Katherine Hegarty. See Complaint, supra note 91, at 9. Factual allegations
42 and 43 of the Complaint filed are as follows:
42. Defendant Atwood [Commissioner of Maine Department of Public
Safety] and Demers [Chief of the Bureau of Maine State Police] acted with
deliberate, reckless and/or callous indifference to the constitutional rights
of persons with whom the police come into contact in failing to provide
defendant Wright [Maine State Police Trooper] with adequate training and
supervision regarding the warrantless entry into houses and/or the use of
force which may be appropriate in situations similar to that involving Kath-
erine Hegarty. This failure to provide adequate training and supervision
was affirmatively linked to the actions taken by Wright.
43. Defendants Atwood and Demers were deliberately indifferent and/or
negligent in hiring, retaining, supervising and/or training Wright.
Id. at 8.
Factual allegations 44 and 45 repeat the charges of allegations 42 and 43 with re-
spect to defendants Somerset County and Spencer Havey (Sheriff for Somerset
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inspire such confidence by proposing: (1) the postponement of an
officer's probationary period until after he or she has successfully
completed the 480 hour basic training period at the Criminal Justice
Academy; 42 (2) an assessment and evaluation of the Academy pro-
gram at least once every seven years;" 3 (3) a consolidation of the
core basic training program for municipal and county law enforce-
ment officers with the basic training program at the State Police
Academy; 14  and (4) a survey and analysis of the use of part-time/
reserve officers and the presentation of a report to the Board of
Trustees of the Academy to be incorporated into the Board's Annual
Report to the Legislature by 1995.15
Part III of the Report addressed the Academy's admissions and
accreditation responsibilities. 46 Citing the importance of public in-
County), and their hiring, retaining, supervising, and/or training of defendant police
officers of the Somerset County Sheriff's Office. Id. at 8. The suit has survived a mo-
tion to dismiss brought by the state defendants. Federal Judge Refuses To Drop
Hagerty [sic] Case, PoRTLmAD PREss HERnD, Apr. 10, 1993, at 5B.
See, e.g., Bowen v. City of Manchester, 966 F.2d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 1992) ("Claims of
inadequate training require proof that the failure to train was a policy or deliberate
choice made by the municipality and that there is a direct link between the munici-
pality's policy and the constitutional violation."); Fournier v. Joyce, 753 F. Supp. 989,
992 (D. Me. 1990) ("A plaintiff may establish a supervisor's liability only by showing
that 'the supervisor's conduct or inaction amounted to a reckless or callous indiffer-
ence to the constitutional rights of others,' and that there was 'an affirmative link'
between the misconduct of the supervised and the indifference of the supervisor.").
See also Barbara Kritchevsky, Making Sense of State of Afind: Determining Respon-
sibility in Section 1983 Municipal Liability Litigation, 60 GEO. WAS.m L Rnv. 417,
432-40 (1992) (discussing two strands of state-of-mind analysis in establishing munic-
ipal liability: 1) the state of mind of the individual defendant in determining whether
he violated the Constitution, and 2) the deliberate indifference of those who make the
municipal policy).
142. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 116, at 6-7. Statistics indicate that
training program requirements nationwide range from 46 hours of basic training to
two years of college with 10 hours of basic training. See Report of the Joint Standing
Committee on Legal Affairs on Law Enforcement Training D.1-1-5 (Jan. 1988) (citing
Survey, International Association of Directors of Law Enforcement Standards and
Training (IADLEST) (1987)).
143. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 116, at 7. The basic training program at
the Maine Criminal Justice Academy offers several courses in which the use of physi-
cal force is discussed. Currently, those courses are: constitutional law, laws of arre3t,
firearms, self-defense, police ethics, road blocks, police power and discretion, search
and seizure, admissions and confessions, use of force, variant behavior, crises conflict,
domestic violence, emergency procedures, and vehicle stops. Id.
144. Id. at 8-9. The Criminal Justice Academy offers a separate State Police
Academy with an augmented curriculum. The total training consists of 835 hours. Id.
at 8. The Task Force suggested that training at the academy move toward a commu-
nity service training model and eliminate the military model of training and the cur-
rent "stress training environment." Id. at 9.
145. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 116, at 10. One of the police officers
involved in the Hegarty incident was a reserve officer for Somerset County. See RE-
LEASE, supra note 85, at 5.
146. See TASK FoRcE REPORT, supra note 116, at 12-14. The Criminal Justice
1993]
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put, the Task Force recommended that the Board be enlarged to
include three public members with no law enforcement affiliation.
Additionally, and in response to a specific suggestion set forth by
the Attorney General in his June 3 release, the Task Force recom-
mended a statutory change to expand the Board's decertification ju-
risdiction to include mandatory review of all cases in which a law
enforcement officer uses deadly force that results in death.14 7 As
part of this recommendation the Task Force further proposed that
the Board carefully monitor the implementation of section 2806 of
title 25 of the Maine statutes.148 This section details the conduct for
which the certificate of a law enforcement officer may be suspended
or revoked and the complaint process for bringing such conduct to
light. The monitoring would include reports on the nature, source,
and outcome of all complaints in the Board's 1993 annual report to
the Legislature. 149 These recommendations, taken together, are inte-
gral to the establishment of a law enforcement system that empha-
sizes the accountability of its officers.
The final, and perhaps most important, part of the Report recom-
mended the development and implementation of a statewide data
collection system on the use of physical force by law enforcement
officers. 150 The data collected would include "the source of each call-
Academy Board of Trustees has the responsibility for establishing both training and
certification standards for all law enforcement officers. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25,
§ 2803-A (West Supp. 1992-1993).
147. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 116, at 13-14.
The June 3, 1992, statement reads:
I shall be recommending to the Legislature that they expand the current
statute regarding law enforcement officers decertification to include the cat-
egory of 'gross deviation from professional standards.' This will allow certi-
fication review of officers involved in similar situations in the future.
See RELEASE, supra note 85, at 2-3.
148. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 116, at 13. This law empowers the
Board of Trustees to revoke or suspend a certificate if a law enforcement officer has
been found guilty of a crime or is found to have engaged in conduct that is criminal.
Under the law, the Board may receive such complaints about an officer from a law
enforcement agency or a member of the public. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 25
(West Supp. 1992-1993).
149. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 116, at 13. Part IV of the Report dealt
with in-service training for law enforcement officers, and recommended: (1) that the
Board set basic minimum annual in-service training requirements including firearms
recertification for all law enforcement officers; (2) that the Regional Training Coun-
cils include public members who have no affiliation with law enforcement; (3) a statu-
tory amendment requiring that all in-service programs offered for law enforcement
officers in Maine, many of which are conducted by private vendors, be certified by the
Academy Board; and (4) the development of a cooperative arrangement with the Uni-
versity Interactive Television System for the delivery of the 1993-94 in-service pro-
grams. Id. at 14-16.
150. Id. at 18. Part V of the Report also recommended the allocation of sufficient
resources to support the use and training of the State Police Tactical Team-a pro-
fessional crisis response team which is often involved in situations where deadly force
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out, the type of call-out, the result of the call-out, the time spent on
the call-out and other such geographic and frequency statistics."'51
The information would then "be reviewed by the Board for possible
procedural or training changes and ... be included in the Acad-
emy's report to the Legislature in 1995.'ll That there currently ex-
ists no such system for the gathering of such statistical information
is indicative of, if not an insensitivity to the potential for systematic
patterns of police misconduct, at least a perception that such mis-
conduct is not widespread. In any event, a reliable and comprehen-
sive source of information recording the use of physical force by po-
lice officers would make for a better informed public. The potential
consequences of the availability of these statistics should not be un-
derestimated. One possible consequence is the use of the data to
spot patterns of misconduct on the part of certain town or munici-
pality police forces and to limit or deny state or federal funding to
those forces.153 Similarly, the availability of such statistics could fa-
cilitate section 1983 actions.'"
As a whole, the Task Force recommendations provide some useful
suggestions for inspiring confidence in the system of law enforce-
ment that exists in Maine. By tightening the standards for all of-
ficers and increasing their accountability by providing for adminis-
trative discipline, the recommendations represent a commendable, if
not complete, attempt at systematic reform. 15
is threatened or used. Id. at 17. It further suggested a review and revision of the
Policy and Procedure Manual that is distributed to all law enforcement agencies for
adaptation and adoption locally. In addition to making the updated Manual widely
available to law enforcement officers, the Report suggests that "[t]he Board, after
consultation with the Attorney General, shall develop a minimum standard policy
and procedure for use of physical force which shall be followed by all law enforcement
agencies." Id. at 19.
151. Id. at 18.
152. Id.
153. See discussion supra note 124.
154. Some courts have looked to the existence of such factors as a pattern of ille-
gal acts, or the knowledge of supervisory officials of prior illegal acts by their subordi-
nates, in determining whether liability on the part of a supervisory official or govern-
mental entity arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Bordanaro v. McLeod, 871
F.2d 1151 (1st Cir. 1989) (municipality found liable where police had long history of
similar violations of warrant requirements that was the equivalent of a policy and
constituted gross negligence amounting to deliberate indifference to the rights of the
public). Cf. Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985) (city could not be held
liable since single incident of excessive force did not establish an official policy or
practice to support inference of inadequate training under Monell v. New York City
Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). See also Susan Bandes, Monell, Porrott,
Daniels, and Davidson: Distinguishing a Custom or Policy from a Random, Unau-
thorized Act, 72 IowA L REv. 101 (1986).
155. On April 1, 1993, approximately one week before this Comment's publication
deadline, a bill was proposed incorporating some of the suggestions of the Task Force
Report. L.D. 1114 (116 Legis. 1993). Most notably, the bill requires: (1) that the




A court entirely secure in the integrity of actions of police officers
would not have reached the Clisham result. The path to a better
system of law enforcement, however, does not lie in a rationale such
as that found in Clisham. If the unstated rationale of Clisham is
that police abuses need to be remedied, then the solution must be
one that in its desire for change embraces the system and the rule of
law. The remedy is not self-help on the corner of a street or in the
doorway of a home. The response to an abuse of police power should
not be violence. Violence breeds violence. The solution lies in civil
remedies, legislative reform such as that set forth in Part VI, and
administrative reforms such as those described in Part VII. The pol-
icy should be "comply now, defend later" in a court of law and, or
alternatively, seek compensation through a civil action.
Law enforcement officers should be given every incentive to follow
the letter of the law, and they should be trained accordingly. But
they should not-in the exercise of their duties-be subjected to
court-encouraged violence, or any violence at all, by a potential
arrestee.
F. Todd Lowell
increased to include three citizens who have no affiliation with law enforcement; and
(2) that this Board be authorized to suspend or revoke the certificate of a law en-
forcement officer if that officer uses deadly force that results in death.
Remarkably, the bill does not state that the revocation or suspension of an officer's
certification is contingent on a finding that the force used by the officer was unlawful
or unjustified. Nor does the bill attempt to establish the parameters of the discretion
of the Board in this determination.
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